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Abstract: The Montreal Protocol is generally credited as a successful example 
of international cooperation in response to a global environmental problem. As a 
result, the production and consumption of ozone-depleting substances has declined 
rapidly, and it is expected that atmospheric ozone concentrations will return to 
their normal ranges toward the end of this century. This paper applies the social-
ecological system framework and common-pool resource theory to explore the 
congruence between successful resolution of small-scale appropriation problems 
and ozone regulation, a large-scale pollution problem. The results of our analysis 
correspond closely to past studies of the Protocol that highlight the importance 
of attributes such as a limited number of major industrial producers, advances in 
scientific knowledge, and the availability of technological substitutes. However, 
in contrast to previous theoretical accounts that focus on one or a few variables, 
our analysis suggests that its success may have been the result of interactions 
between a wider range of SES attributes, many of which are associated with 
338 Graham Epstein et al.
successful small-scale environmental governance. Although carefully noting the 
limitations of drawing conclusions from the analysis of a single case, our analysis 
reveals the potential for fruitful interplay between common-pool resource theory 
and large-scale pollution problems.
Keywords: Air pollution, common-pool resource theory, ozone, global collective 
action, SESMAD, social-ecological systems
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1. Introduction
The Montreal Protocol has long been discussed as one of few examples of a 
successful global response to a large-scale environmental problem. The protocol, 
enacted on January 1, 1989, was designed to protect the ozone layer by gradually 
reducing and, in some cases, eliminating the production of a variety of ozone-
depleting substances (ODS). Initially ratified by 21 nations, it is now one of the 
few truly global agreements having obtained universal acceptance as of September 
2009. Although the environmental goals of the Montreal Protocol have not been 
met, it is expected that the cumulative reductions in the emission of ODS will 
begin to have an impact on global ozone concentrations toward the middle of the 
twenty-first century (Ravishankara 2009). The Montreal Protocol has also been 
the subject of considerable academic and public debate that seeks to understand 
how, despite a multiplicity of potential impediments including vested industrial 
interests, a large group of actors with divergent interests and limited knowledge 
were able to agree upon and subsequently implement a set of rules to resolve a 
complex collective-action problem.
This paper, as part of the Social-Ecological Systems Meta-Analysis Database 
(SESMAD) project, explores the Montreal Protocol through the lens of common-
pool resource (CPR) theory. SESMAD builds upon earlier meta-analytical efforts 
such as the CPR database (Ostrom 1990), Regime Effectiveness study (Miles 
et al. 2002) and the International Regime Database designed by Breitmeier et al. 
(2006). As described by Cox in the introduction to this special issue, SESMAD 
is a database broadly based on the Social-Ecological System (SES) framework 
(Ostrom 2007, 2009; Ostrom and Cox 2010). The SES framework emerged from 
growing recognition that social-ecological outcomes are the product of complex 
interactions among diverse actors, institutions, and biophysical systems (Agrawal 
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2003; Wilson 2006). The framework therefore organizes these components such 
that scholars can begin to build generalizable knowledge concerning the effects 
of SES attributes on outcomes such as sustainability in varied SES contexts and 
using multiple methods of inquiry. The goals of the SESMAD project are twofold: 
to provide a common framework and measures for cross-case comparisons of 
theoretically relevant attributes, and to create a systematic approach to analyze 
individual cases.
Given the breadth and depth of prior studies of the Montreal Protocol, some of 
which included first-hand accounts (i.e. Benedick 2009), the primary contribution 
of this investigation is to extend the existing CPR literature into two distinct 
directions. First, like the other papers in this special issue, it examines the extent 
to which CPR theory, a stream of collective-action theory developed in mostly 
small-scale settings, may apply to large, in this case, global collective-action 
problems. Secondly, it asks whether theories and models developed to understand 
appropriation externalities at the heart of traditional commons dilemmas apply to 
a pollution problem or the externalities of production. Thus, the insights generated 
from this analysis, while not necessarily unique in the context of the Montreal 
Protocol, provide a potentially valuable starting point for comparative analysis of 
large-scale environmental governance of pollution problems.
With the exception of recent critiques of the neoliberal philosophies or market 
perspectives that shaped the treaty (Gareau 2013), most studies view the Montreal 
Protocol as an unprecedented success. In fact, it is commonly studied through 
the lens of international relations theory (e.g. Viotti and Kauppi 2012) precisely 
because it is one of few examples of successful international environmental policy. 
The international arena is commonly described as anarchic in that no one actor has 
the legal authority to enlist or sanction other states unless that state has committed 
itself to some agreement and sacrificed its sovereign authority (Stokke 2011). 
Thus, international relations theory seeks to understand the conditions under 
which sovereign states voluntarily bind themselves to bilateral or multilateral 
agreements. A variety of studies have explored the Montreal Protocol to better 
understand regime formation and successful environmental governance by 
focusing on the role of agenda-setting (Morrisette 1989), epistemic communities 
(Haas 1992), discourses (Liftin 1994), and institutions (Grundmann 2001).
More recently, scholars have turned to the policy-science interface to consider 
the interaction between knowledge production and the role that it plays in 
mobilizing and sustaining collective action. For example, Parson (2003) argues 
that the Montreal Protocol broke through stalled diplomatic negotiations via a 
three-step process. First, scientific assessments illustrating the severity and causes 
of ozone depletion were considered authoritative enough to influence policy 
actors. Second, the regime included novel institutional arrangements, such as 
an assessment process with industry participants to evaluate new technological 
substitutes for chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). Third, the regime allowed for rapid 
changes in operational rules based on new knowledge and generated incentives 
for rapid technological change. Richard Benedick (2009), the past chief negotiator 
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for the US, makes a similar claim and credits the creativity and independence of 
scientists and scientific assessments in mobilizing nations toward a resolution.
Whereas most prior accounts of the Montreal Protocol tend to explore 
the effects of variable dyads such as knowledge and motivation or authority 
and knowledge, our analysis and the SESMAD project in general considers 
configurations of mostly institutional attributes that jointly affect social and 
environmental outcomes. One of the strengths of the SESMAD approach is to 
take complementary and sometimes competing narratives of collective action 
problems and place them into a diagnostic framework. This facilitates analysis 
of the context in which collective action occurs, and allows us to dig deeper than 
single variables such as leadership or technological innovation to explore factors 
or contingent variables that are not necessarily predictable across cases. Therefore 
it is precisely because the Montreal Protocol is well-studied that we chose it for 
our analysis to consider the multiple possible sources of successful large-scale 
environmental governance.
1.1. Background on common-pool resource theory
CPR theory, as the name implies, is a theory borne out of the study of a particular 
type of good – common goods (i.e. fish, many forests, wildlife). Types of goods 
are generally distinguished from one another on the basis of two characteristics: 
the subtractability of use and difficulty in excluding potential beneficiaries 
(Ostrom et al. 1994; Ostrom and Ostrom 1999). Subtractability of a good 
refers to the extent to which appropriation by one individual affects the supply 
for other individuals. Exclusion, on the other hand, refers to the feasibility of 
excluding potential recipients from the benefits or costs of a good. Public goods, 
like ozone protection, are similar to common goods in that exclusion is difficult. 
Likewise, exclusion is difficult in the context of public bads, such as the emission 
of pollutants, at least within the geographic range of environmental effects. For 
instance, the environmental effects or costs of sulfur emissions from coal-fired 
power generators are felt at a large regional scale (i.e. eastern US and Canada) 
(Stavins 1998), while particulates often introduce health-related costs at a more 
limited, local scale (Schwartz 1994; Katsouyanni et al. 1997). The costs associated 
with a decline in ozone concentrations are felt at a global scale, meaning that 
the loss of ozone protection is shared in part by the entire global population. 
Unlike common goods, however, the use of pure public goods (and bads) is not 
subtractable. Put simply, when an individual takes advantage of ozone protection, 
a public good, or incurs costs from its absence, their use of that good does not in 
any way affect the supply available to others. While there are few examples of 
pure public goods, in that they are often subject to congestion and thereby lead 
to de facto subtractability, ozone protection that is produced via natural chemical 
processes is very nearly, if not fully, a pure public good.
The link between CPR theory and the case of pollution is not, however, 
based on the characteristics of a good per se but rather on the effects of those 
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characteristics on the incentive structure surrounding choices related to the 
production or appropriation of goods. In other words, we do not make the claim 
that pollution or the ozone layer is in some manner a common-pool resource. 
Rather, the same logic that theoretically drives overappropriation of CPRs also 
provides insights about factors driving global ozone depletion. The tragedy of 
the commons (Hardin 1968), for instance, showed how the underlying incentive 
structure of ungoverned common goods leads to overappropriation given that 
benefits are privately owned and costs are shared. A similar logic applies to the 
provision of public goods that tend to be underproduced as a result of private costs 
and shared benefits (Wit and Wilke 1998; Hansen et al. 2005).
Broadly speaking, overappropriation of a common good, underprovision 
of public goods, and overproduction of public bads present remarkably similar 
choice environments in that they describe situations of interdependent choice and 
an incentive structure resembling the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Furthermore, the core 
analytical question in these situations is how to structure institutions to favor more 
beneficial and efficient social outcomes. While most institutional studies that 
broadly constitute CPR theory have focused on problems surrounding common 
goods and problems of appropriation, some have applied similar methods to 
pollution problems (Ostrom et al. 1961; Lo and Tang 1994; Gardner et al. 2000; 
Lundqvist 2001; Ostrom 2010). In their now-classic introduction to polycentric 
metropolitan governance, Ostrom et al. (1961, 835) identified the importance of 
organizing institutions at a scale that “can encompass the problem.” In this way, 
the institutions are better able to align the costs and benefits of a public good or 
regulation of a public bad such as pollution.
In the context of the Montreal Protocol, atmospheric ozone and ODS 
represent two distinct goods. Atmospheric ozone is a public good that generates 
shared benefits in the form of ozone protection, and private costs in the form of 
abatement. For much of human history, however, ozone protection was effectively 
freely provided by natural chemical processes. It was not until ODS, a public bad, 
was released into the atmosphere in sufficiently large concentrations to disrupt 
natural generative processes (Rowland 2009) that the situation was transformed 
into a social dilemma. Similar to common goods, when individuals or groups 
choose to produce or consume ODS, the underlying incentive structure of that 
choice reflects only the private benefits from selling or using that product as a 
refrigerant or propellant – neglecting the collective costs associated with their use. 
Therefore, despite important differences in the properties of common goods and 
public bads, the similarity of the choice environment suggests the possibility of 
correspondence with CPR theory.
In the sections that follow, we first provide a brief background concerning 
the methodological approach of this study. Next, we apply the SES framework to 
identify the critical components of the system, present the primary results of our 
research – the timeline and structure of the case as well as the key variables that 
emerged during our diagnostic analysis. Our results are presented in two parts. 
First we set the stage by considering attributes of the resources and actors at the 
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outset of the case that theoretically affect prospects for collective action. Next we 
consider a subset of social, technological and institutional attributes drawn from 
the CPR literature and prior studies of the Montreal protocol to identify factors 
that may have contributed to its success. This also allows us to generate insights 
concerning the extent to which attributes associated with successful small-scale 
CPR governance are associated with successful global governance of pollutants.
2. Methods
As described above, this study, like others described in this special issue, draws 
upon methods that were developed collaboratively as part of the SESMAD project. 
Secondary data was collected by the authors and used to code data into a relational 
database hosted at Dartmouth College based on Ostrom’s SES framework (Ostrom 
2007, 2009) as modified by Cox (2014). The database contains approximately 200 
variables of relevance to the study of SESs. These are stored in tables describing 
the SES itself, its components, and the interactions among these components, as 
follows.
A SES is defined as a unit possessing at least one environmental commons 
(i.e. resources, ecosystem, pollutants), governance system, and actor group. 
Basic information about these components is recorded in the case table that 
provides the most general depiction of the SES. An environmental commons 
(EC) is an environmental resource or pollutant that can be subjected to human 
use, production, and/or governance. A governance system (GS) is a set of 
institutional arrangements (such as rules, policies, and governance activities) 
that affect interactions between one or more actor groups and an environmental 
commons (EC). Finally, an actor group (A) can be comprised of individuals, 
organizations, or nations that have developed a set of institutional arrangements 
in order to manage human interactions in a specific environmental system, or 
who alter resource characteristics through extraction or emission. Within the 
relational database, interactions between these components are stored as records 
in the interactions (I) table. There are two main types of interactions; governance 
interactions that record information about interactions between one or more actor 
groups, multiple governance systems and a single environmental commons, and 
biophysical interactions that record information about interactions between two 
or more environmental commons. Different interactions are also used to represent 
different “snapshots” within the same case reflecting important changes in the 
components or their attributes that affect interactions in a case (Haydu 1998).
Figure 1 shows how this framework was operationalized for the Montreal 
Protocol to code two distinct snapshots. In the context of the Montreal Protocol, 
the pre- and post-1989 period were selected as they mark an important shift in 
international affairs regarding the ways in which nations approached the problem 
of ozone depletion and emission of ODS. The most notable changes are the 
addition of a governance system, the Montreal Protocol, and an actor group, the 
Ozone Secretariat. The first snapshot is denoted open access, while the second is 
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referred to as international cooperation. The boxes in the figure refer to the actual 
tables in the relational database. Finally, interactions between environmental 
commons are coded in a separate interactions table, which is why two distinct 
sets of interactions are shown for each snapshot.
This paper relies upon a mixture of peer-reviewed articles and book chapters, 
as well as unedited books, grey literature published by the Secretariat and data 
from the Ozone Secretariat’s internet archives to enter data into the SESMAD 
database. The case was coded based on intersubjective agreement after the authors 
independently evaluated multiple studies of the case. While this approach limits 
estimates concerning the reliability of coding, it is consistent with prior studies 
of the commons (Ostrom 1990; Wertime et al. 2007; Cox et al. 2010), and may 
enhance the prospects for validity of measurement. Furthermore, given that this 
analysis of a single case relies upon multiple accounts using different theoretical 
perspectives and a certain degree of topical overlap, intersubjective agreement 
allows us to average over the evidence where the nature of a variable is uncertain, 
or alternatively make an informed choice from among the evidence where one 
account is more reliable than another.
As discussed in the introduction, a goal of this paper is to generate insights 































Figure 1: Diagram of the two snapshots (open access conditions at top and Post-Montreal 
Protocol below) coded for analysis of the Montreal Protocol and the control of ozone-depleting 
substances (ODS). (Blue square boxes: core components coded into SESMAD database. Red 
curved boxes: governance and biophysical interactions among core components).
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developed in the context of small-scale appropriation dilemmas. While the 
database contains more than 200 potentially influential variables, a much smaller 
subset of these is considered in this paper. In Sections 4.1 and 4.2, we consider 
attributes of the resource (ozone and ODS) and actors that theoretically affect 
prospects for collective action and successful environmental governance. These 
attributes structure the incentives that actors face as they seek to resolve collective 
action problems, and allow us to make general theoretical predictions regarding 
the likelihood of successful self-organization. For instance, small groups with 
common interests are likely to face fewer challenges for self-organization than 
a large group with divergent interests. Next, Section 4.3 explores factors that 
may have contributed to the transition from an open-access system to successful 
international regulation of ODS by comparing a subset of social, technological 
and institutional attributes across the two snapshots. Most of these attributes, such 
as participation of affected parties, and monitoring were drawn from CPR theory 
and the related SES framework, while we also include a small subset of attributes 
such as technological substitutes that were particularly prominent in the reviewed 
literature. The paper thus seeks to balance the goals of evaluating CPR theory 
through a meta-analytic structure with an attempt to capture the idiosyncratic 
details of the case. Neither activity obviates the importance of the other, nor do we 
see this as evidence of shortcomings in the framework. Similar context-specific 
variables emerge in every case analyzed in this special issue, in spite of the depth 
of analysis provided by the framework.
3. Structure of the case and social-ecological outcomes
The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer has now been 
universally ratified and is considered one of few successful examples of broad-
based international cooperation. Since 1989, when the Montreal Protocol entered 
into force, the production of ODS, most notably CFCs, has rapidly declined and 
it is expected that atmospheric ozone concentrations will return to their normal 
ranges toward the end of this century (Figure 2).
We structured the analysis of the system around two snapshots (Table 1) 
that are generally marked as major changes in the conditions of one or more 
critical attributes. The first of these snapshots lasts from the mid-1970s, when the 
potential threat of ozone-depleting substances was first realized, until 1989, when 
the Montreal Protocol was ratified. The second snapshot runs from the ratification 
of the Montreal Protocol until its 25th Anniversary (2012).
Using the SESMAD framework (Cox 2014), we see that the major change 
between the two periods is the creation, development, and implementation of a 
governance system that manages the production and release of ODS and, in the 
process, indirectly manages ozone. The second, subsidiary change related to the 
establishment of a governance system is the introduction of the Ozone Secretariat.
The Ozone Secretariat is based at the United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP) offices in Nairobi (Kenya). The Secretariat functions in accordance 
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with article 12 of the Montreal Protocol, and its duties include administration, 
monitoring implementation, collection and processing of ODS data from the 
parties to the convention, and providing information concerning the ozone 
layer. Prior to the ratification of the Montreal Protocol, select governments in 
the industrialized world introduced limited industry regulations regarding 
substances later restricted by the Montreal Protocol. However, the key shift was 
the coordination of regulation, monitoring, and, to a lesser extent, enforcement 
of ODS emissions via the Montreal Protocol. Figure 1 shows the structure we 
used for the analysis of this SES. Two resources are distinguished in this case: 
(1) the ODS that are produced by the industrial actors and directly managed by 
the governance system after the ratification of the Montreal Protocol and (2) the 
ozone layer that is affected by the concentration of ODS. The main governance 
system, the Montreal Protocol, seeks to alter the behavior of producers of ODS, 
the industrial actors, and was designed and implemented by the nation-states that 
ratified it and the Ozone Secretariat who manages it.
4. Results
The analysis presented in this section draws upon our synthesis of multiple studies 
using the SESMAD database to explore factors that may have contributed to the 
observed decline in ODS production (Figure 2). While most of these attributes are 
Figure 2: Adoption and performance of the Montreal Protocol reporting the cumulative number 
of countries ratifying the Montreal Protocol, area of the ozone hole, and production of CFCs. 
Sources: http://ozone.unep.org/new_site/en/index.php; http://ozonewatch.gsfc.nasa.gov/.
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Table 1: Major events relating to the regime formation and subsequent milestones of the 
Montreal Protocol and the control of ozone-depleting substances (ODS).
Snapshot  Date  Event
 1939  CFCs are invented.
 1973  R. Stolarsky and R. Cicerone indicate that chlorine released into the 
stratosphere could unleash a complicated chemical process that would 
continually destroy ozone for several decades (published in 1974).
 1974  M. Molina and S. Rowland discover that, unlike most other gases, CFCs are 
not chemically broken down or rained out quickly in the lower atmosphere 
but rather, because of their exceptionally stable chemical structure, persist and 
migrate slowly up to the stratosphere. They conclude that CFCs are eventually 
broken down by solar radiation and, in the process, release large quantities of 
chlorine into the stratosphere.
 1970s  Start of international scientific efforts to begin cooperation on research with an 





 1977  International cooperation starts with a conference of experts from 32 countries, 
convened by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), adoption 
of the World Plan of Action, and establishing a Coordinating Committee.
 1981  The UNEP Governing Council authorizes negotiations to attempt to create a 
binding treaty on measures to protect the ozone layer.
 1985  Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer.
 1986  Ozone hole is clearly observed.
 1987  Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer successfully 
negotiated and opened for signatures.
 1988  NASA-sponsored Ozone Trends Panel reports that ozone depletion was 





 1989  The Montreal Protocol enters into force.
1990  Second meeting of parties to Montreal Protocol at London. London 
amendments to the Montreal Protocol.
 1992  Copenhagen amendments to the Montreal Protocol permanently establish the 
Multilateral Fund.
 1997  Montreal amendments to the Montreal Protocol.
 1999  Beijing amendments to the Montreal Protocol.
 2007  Montreal Declaration.
 2012  25th Anniversary of the Montreal Protocol.
Sources: Benedick (1998); http://ozone.unep.org.
commonly associated with CPR theory and the SES framework, we also consider 
a small subset of case-specific attributes. These attributes are not included in the 
SESMAD database, but were highlighted as particularly important by several of 
the reviewed studies. Thus it is also possible to evaluate the general diagnostic 
potential of the SESMAD database for large-scale pollution cases by considering 
whether the omission of these attributes would critically undermine our analysis of 
the Montreal Protocol or alternatively whether they would be necessary additions 
to the database for future analyses of large-scale pollution. The analysis proceeds 
by first setting the stage in terms of resource and actor attributes during the first 
snapshot that theoretically affect prospects for successful collective action. It then 
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continues by exploring changes (or the lack thereof) in the social, technological 
and institutional environment across the two snapshots.
4.1. Resource attributes
Resource attributes are often neglected in the literature on the commons (Agrawal 
2003; Epstein et al. 2013); which tends instead to focus on the institutional and 
social aspects of successful environmental governance. Nonetheless, a small 
subset of resource attributes have received considerable attention as they structure 
the incentives and challenges that actors face as they seek to resolve collective 
action problems. These include the clarity of resource boundaries, mobility of 
resource units, and the rate at which management efforts can feasibly improve 
resource conditions (Schlager et al. 1994; Basurto and Ostrom 2009).
At the outset, the characteristics of ODS and ozone appear ill-suited to CPR 
governance as outlined in Table 2. Both are small (effectively invisible), highly 
mobile substances that are distributed throughout the earth’s atmosphere. Resource 
mobility across institutional boundaries has long been held as a challenging and 
sometimes insurmountable problem for CPR governance (Schlager et al. 1994; 
Giordano 2003) as it tends to increase uncertainties regarding the ability of 
groups to capture the benefits of their management efforts. For instance, cutbacks 
in the production and consumption of ODS in the US and Europe would yield 
few benefits if emissions simply shifted to other countries. Thus, regulation of 
ODS effectively demanded global participation and mechanisms to ensure that 
participants could not simply offshore their emissions to a few non-participating 
nations. A further challenge for collective action was the long atmospheric 
residence time of ODS. This meant that even with a rapid halt to ODS emissions 
that most, if not all, of the participants to negotiations would not live to enjoy 
the benefits of their efforts (although they could limit further costs). Moreover, 
vote-seeking political actors would have to justify the costs of a policy that would 
yield few observable benefits for their constituents. Surprisingly, in the case of 
Table 2: Resource attributes.
Attribute  Resource
Ozone  ODS
Spatial extent  Global  Global
Physical boundaries  Clear boundaries Unclear boundaries
Speed of feedback  Slow (decades)  Emissions: rapid
  Atmospheric concentrations: slow
Size of units  Small  Small
Mobility  High  High
*Residence time  –  Variable, but generally high (2–550 years)
Source of emissions –  Primarily point source
*Attribute is not recorded in the SESMAD database.
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the Montreal Protocol, these attributes, when combined with the general sense of 
looming crisis that surrounded negotiations, seems to have motivated participants 
to develop global regulations to control ODS emissions.
Finally, there was an additional resource attribute that greatly facilitated 
regulation, which is alluded to by our choice to group all ODS into a single 
category. ODS include a wide range of anthropogenic chemicals such as CFCs, 
HCFCs, and carbon tetrachloride that interact with ozone in the atmosphere 
and ultimately lead to its dissociation and the loss of ozone protection (Isaksen 
et al. 2009). However, their effects vary as a result of chemical differences that 
affect their level of reactivity and atmospheric residence time (Pyle et al. 1992). 
Fortunately, growing knowledge of the underlying chemical processes allowed 
regulators to develop a standardized metric, ozone-depletion potential, to regulate 
emissions such that the most damaging compounds were replaced by less-
damaging compounds, followed by a phase-out or ban for most purposes (Parson 
2003). In other words, negotiators were able to devise effective regulations 
for ODS by considering a single attribute, ozone-depletion potential, and then 
focusing early efforts on the most damaging compounds.
4.2. Actor attributes
The literature on collective action generally suggests that small groups with 
homogeneous interests (Olson 1965), and shared norms (Ostrom 1990, 2009) are 
more likely to successfully resolve collective-action problems. More specifically, 
the proportional benefits of collective action are larger in shared groups, increasing 
the likelihood that this exceeds the private costs of collective action. Homogenous 
interests, on the other hand, increase prospects for successful collective action by 
reducing the costs associated with reaching agreement regarding the purpose of 
collective activities. In contrast with accounts based on shared interests, several 
scholars have noted that prospects for successful collective action may increase 
dramatically when the individual benefits of collective action for one or a small 
subset of actors within a group exceed the total costs of self-organization (Olson 
1965; Hardin 1982; Baland and Platteau 1999). Hardin (1982) labels such groups 
as privileged because even if other actors fail to contribute (i.e. act as free-riders), 
the smaller subset still stands to benefit from the provision of a public good. This 
has been applied to the case of greenhouse gas production to suggest that the US 
and China working as a pair could have a significant impact on carbon emissions, 
even without cooperation of many signatories to the Kyoto Protocol.
Of the two actors included in the first snapshot of the Montreal Protocol 
case, the industrial group of producers appears best suited to engage in collective 
action to successfully mobilize against a treaty as outlined in Table 3. Although 
there were a fairly large number of industrial CFC producers around the world, a 
comparatively smaller number of these concentrated in the US and Europe, were 
responsible for a considerable fraction of emissions, and also stood to absorb 
much of the costs associated with abatement. Thus CPR theory would generally 
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predict that this group would be able to successfully oppose environmental 
regulations through self-organization or the individual lobbying efforts of large-
scale producers such as DuPont. On the other hand, the nation-states, composed 
of a large number of actors with heterogeneous norms, and interests that varied 
along at least two dimensions – their status as a producer nation and their ability to 
pay for more expensive substitutes – is not suggestive of a group likely to resolve 
a collective-action problem. Nonetheless, they did eventually manage to organize 
successfully, which is surprising given the favorable attributes of the industrial 
group. As a whole, the results suggest that actor attributes are, at best, part of a 
more complex story that is mediated by other aspects of the social, institutional, 
and ecological environment (Agrawal and Yadama 1997; Vedeld 2000; Poteete 
and Ostrom 2004).
4.3. Changes across snapshots
Given the challenges associated with governing ODS emissions for global ozone 
recovery, as well as actor characteristics that favored collective action against 
regulation, the prospects for successful implementation of the Montreal protocol 
seemed dim. Nonetheless, CPR theory is characterized by an optimistic assertion 
that most, if not all, environmental problems can be resolved provided that actors 
identify and implement the “right institutions” for a given context (Young 2002; 
Ostrom 2007). This section therefore considers changes in the social, institutional, 
and political landscape across the two snapshots that coincide with the shift 
from an open-access system to successful regulation of an atmospheric pollutant 
(Table 4). Although specific institutions associated with successful environmental 
governance vary considerably, certain attributes of those institutions such as 
participation of affected parties, spatial fit, proportionality and monitoring have 
been shown to apply to a wide range of circumstances (Ostrom 1990; Cox et al. 
2010).
Political participation and institutional fit: The CPR literature clearly suggests 
that the participation of affected parties (Ostrom 1990) and the fit between 
institutions and environmental problems (Young 2002; Folke et al. 2007) are 
Table 3: Actor attributes.
Attribute  Actors
Industry  Nation-states
Group size  Large, but fewer major producers Large
Heterogeneity of interests Low  High
*Users concentration  High  –
Privileged members  Yes  Yes
*Attribute is not recorded in the SESMAD database.
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important drivers of successful environmental governance. Our case study begins 
with anarchy at the international level (Milner 1991), consisting of uncoordinated 
regulation by the US and other nation states. By the end of the second snapshot, 
however, the case is characterized by international cooperation and universal 
agreement on a set of common and relatively strict ODS production and trade 
policies. This shift stems from a dramatic change in collective-choice institutions 
and processes after enactment of the agreement and aligns the governance system 
with the scale of environmental impacts. Furthermore, the Montreal Protocol 
provided mechanisms for participation by a multiplicity of actors, including 
developing nations and key industrial actors like DuPont. An argument could 
be made that prior to adoption of the protocol that ODS was governed at the 
international level by markets for ODS products. However, as the market did 
not internalize externalities of production, the use of national-level regulations to 
resolve externalities manifested at the global scale generated a spatial mismatch 
between institutions and ODS emissions.
Proportionality: In terms of natural resource commons, proportionality 
describes a state in which the benefits that actors accrue from a good are 
proportional to the amount of inputs required to sustain that good in the form 
of labor or resources, as determined by the rules in use (Ostrom 1990). For 
pollutants, the logic of proportionality is somewhat different, and speaks to 
congruence between past emissions, or the introduction of negative externalities, 
and the level of contributions in terms of public goods provision and the 
extent of emission cuts. While the whole world stood to gain from cutbacks 
in emissions, the problem itself originated quite clearly in the developed 
world. These same countries were also better situated to incur the costs to 
provide public goods and abatement given their economic conditions. After 
Table 4: Changes across snapshots.
Attribute  First snapshot  Second snapshot
Political participation  Limited  High
Spatial fit  Misfit  Fit
Proportionality  Absent  Present
Leadership  Present  Present
Technological substitute Absent  Present
Economic dependence  High  Low
Nested governance  Absent at start, informal at end of snapshot Formalized
Flexible institutions  Yes, but uncoordinated  Yes, coordinated
Scientific knowledge  Limited but growing  Strong
Scientific consensus  Absent  Present
Graduated sanctions  Absent  Absent
Social monitoring  Limited  Present
*Social pressure  Present, but uncoordinated  Present and coordinated
*Attribute is not recorded in the SESMAD database.
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the Copenhagen Amendments in 1992, a financing scheme – the Multilateral 
Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol – was created to assist 
countries with low per capita production and consumption of ODS. This fund 
provided developing countries with direct aid and technology transfers to 
compensate them for the costs of ODS substitutes (Parson 2003). The financial 
assistance mechanism, combined with a delayed timetable for the developing 
world helped to ensure global implementation with proportional distributions 
of costs and benefits.
Leadership, economic dependence, and technological substitute: Leadership in 
favor of regulation by key industrial actors, most notably DuPont is often identified 
as a critical change that facilitated agreement on and rapid implementation of 
the Montreal Protocol (Parson 2003; Benedick 2009). DuPont’s shift from an 
antagonistic stance, however, was far from an act of altruism as their investments 
in research and development had led to the production of ODS substitutes. 
This lessened their own, as well as society’s dependence on ODS products; 
and also provided selective incentives for DuPont to encourage strict and rapid 
implementation of the Montreal Protocol since they would initially dominate the 
market for ODS substitutes. Leadership by UNEP, on behalf of developing nations 
was also seen as a crucial factor that reduced transaction costs and sustained 
pressure for developed nations that had created the problem to compensate them 
for the costs of ODS regulation (Benedick 2009). Finally, Richard Benedick, the 
chief US negotiator was a leading figure throughout negotiations and helped to 
ensure that negotiations did not fall apart (Parson 2003).
Nested governance and flexible institutions: At the outset of the negotiations, 
the main negotiating body was composed of a relatively small number of rich 
countries (i.e. US, European Community, UK) responsible for most of the 
production of ODS and a large number of mostly poorer countries that produced 
little ODS, but who would be disproportionately affected by the (potentially) 
high costs of alternatives (Downie 1999). As negotiations progressed, however, 
the groups began to self-organize into subgroups according to their interests, 
capacities, and resources and enabled a global agreement among a large number 
of heterogeneous participants that nonetheless shared one common interest in 
avoiding the consequences of ozone depletion. This nested structure is now 
formalized with the Multilateral fund, whose executive committee is comprised 
of seven members from each of the developing and developed countries that are 
party to the protocol.
The self-organization of countries into groups with similar interests helped to 
reduce a variety of transaction costs associated with designing and implementing 
the protocol. Developing countries, mostly through their unofficial representative 
(UNEP), were able to negotiate a financial and technical assistance package in 
addition to the previously established delayed implementation that provided for 
better alignment between the benefits and costs of abatement given past patterns 
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of emissions. These incentives moved the otherwise heterogeneous parties closer 
to their operational goals. Developed nations benefited from greater participation 
in the Montreal Protocol, which increased the likelihood that their efforts would 
lead to the desired results. Similarly developing nations would be able to offset 
some of their costs with direct contributions from privileged members. Thus, 
institutional flexibility according to the heterogeneous capacities and interests 
of groups greatly facilitated successful negotiation and implementation of the 
Montreal Protocol (Barratt-Brown 1991; Downie 1999).
Scientific knowledge and consensus: Concern with the ozone layer originated 
from scientific investigations of atmospheric processes. During much of the 
first snapshot, the visibility of ozone depletion was effectively non-existent, 
and where knowledge existed it was often highly contested. However, scientific 
knowledge improved rapidly with increased attention on issues concerning 
ozone depletion and as a result of investments in environmental monitoring the 
visibility of the relationship between ozone depletion and ODS became clear to 
most, if not all, participants. Scientific consensus and the development of a strong 
environmental monitoring system therefore allowed the participants to justify 
rapid implementation of ODS regulations by stressing the urgency for action, 
creating a sense of crisis and resolve.
Social monitoring and graduated sanctions: In addition to environmental 
monitoring, information about users’ behavior fostered cooperation (Ostrom et al. 
1994). The Ozone Secretariat played a leadership role as a bridging agent both 
in brokering agreements concerning north-south financial arrangements and as a 
social monitor and compiler of national and aggregate ODS emission data (Barratt-
Brown 1991). As a result, the Secretariat is seen as an independent facilitator for 
social monitoring between convention parties. In contrast, graduated sanctions 
an important element of successful small-scale collective action (McKean 1982; 
Ostrom 1990) is absent across the two snapshots. Given the generally positive 
performance of the Protocol and the absence of any form of sanctioning at the 
international level, it would seem that graduated sanctions may be less applicable 
for successful collective action among nations.
Social pressure: Social pressure is an external factor to our system as defined in 
the case that provoked a rapid response from governments and other stakeholders 
after a long period of inaction. Although environmental NGOs had been pressuring 
individual governments for many years, it was not until groups in the US, Europe, 
and the developing world met in London and coordinated around a specific 
proposal that these efforts translated into policy in the form of strict regulations 
and short timetables for ODS reductions (Barratt-Brown 1991). Drawing upon 
recent scientific evidence, these groups were able to influence previously hesitant 
parties to agree to these stringent regulations, and move toward a system that met 
the needs of developing countries.
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4.4. Similarities and differences with CPR theory
The study of the commons and SESs has oriented itself around questions of when 
groups will be able to successfully resolve collective-action problems (Ostrom 
1990; Wade 1994; Baland and Platteau 1999). While there is general consensus 
around a core set of design principles, the effects of variables are often presumed 
to be mediated by the state of other variables in complex SESs. In this section, 
we consider the similarities and differences of the key variables found in our case 
study with those key variables proposed in the CPR theory while making note of 
the two most significant sources of variations in our case from traditional CPR 
theory: the nature of the good and global nature of the system.
A number of variables highlighted in Table 4 seem to conform to the 
expectations of CPR theory and likely contributed to the successful regulation of 
ODS. Proportionality relative to historical emissions and heterogeneous levels of 
development appears to have made a major contribution in moving the Montreal 
Protocol from a largely western to a global governance system (Sarma and Taddonio 
2009). This, in turn, was facilitated by the self-organization of developing nations 
under the unofficial leadership of UNEP as an informal type of nested governance 
that lowered transaction costs associated with negotiations. However, other CPR 
attributes failed to enjoy the same level of support, most notably: well-defined 
physical boundaries and graduated sanctions. In fact, the absence of relevant 
resource boundaries seems to have motivated action by generating a global sense 
of crisis. Graduated sanctions are also absent, but appear to have little impact on 
either the level of compliance or overall emissions. It is not entirely clear if size, 
the nature of the good, or some other combination of attributes limit the influence 
of its absence, but what is clear is that compliance has remained high despite the 
fact that protocol sanctions have never been used (Sarma and Taddonio 2009). 
Finally, although the protocol incorporated a measure of flexibility to account for 
its heterogeneous parties, the operational rules that governed ODS production 
limited national-level regulatory diversity to a “two-sizes-fits-all” approach. 
This limited diversity differs substantially from the higher levels of institutional 
diversity observed in many CPR settings (Ostrom et al. 1994). Nonetheless, 
as CPR theory progressed, the focus on local governance shifted to emphasize 
the fit between institutions and SES environments (Acheson 2006), and it is 
not necessarily surprising that a centralized regime successfully resolved what 
amounts to a global problem with a small number of major producers.
5. Discussion
The story of the Montreal Protocol often reads as a monumental achievement, 
against considerable odds, that promised to provide a starting point for future 
international responses to global environmental problems. Certainly, the speed 
at which a large number of interested parties were able to overcome their 
differences stands in contrast to conventional predictions that transaction costs in 
large groups substantially reduce the likelihood of voluntary provision of public 
354 Graham Epstein et al.
goods. Nevertheless, the Montreal Protocol, while not predestined for success, 
had several factors in its favor that substantially increased these odds. In what 
follows, we highlight three ways in which the research program described in this 
special issue, and this study in particular, draws fresh insight on a well-studied 
case. We also address key shortcomings that arose in the process.
5.1. Findings from the SES framework
One of the clear challenges to “scaling-up” CPR theory in this study was the 
nature of the regulated good, pollution – a classic externality of production rather 
than a traditional CPR. While difficulty of exclusion is shared, use or consumption 
of the public bad is not subtractable, and concerns center on overproduction rather 
than overappropriation. As a result, the governance system had to recognize a 
three-step causal process: from the production of private goods that (1) resulted in 
the release of ODS, (2) affected global atmospheric ozone concentrations and (3) 
generated private costs. This analysis revealed that despite these differences, the 
SES framework and CPR theory may be relevant for the analysis of other types 
of goods. However, the results also showed that some aspects of CPR theory, 
particularly those that relate to resource boundaries and graduated sanctions, do 
not directly correspond to this and possibly other pollution cases.
Given that the shift from a small-scale CPR to a large-scale public bad alters 
the conditions in which decisions are made, it is not entirely surprising to find that 
SES attributes have different effects. For example, Ostrom’s (2007) introduction 
to the SES framework points out how a change to a single variable, the ability to 
communicate, has a dramatic effect on individual and aggregate payoffs in CPR 
experiments. The SES framework builds upon this general premise to include a 
wide range of potentially influential attributes, and suggests that social-ecological 
outcomes in particular and human behavior in general are a function of the 
combination of attributes that collectively structure choice environments. In the 
case of pollution, a particularly noteworthy change to this structure is that additional 
units of pollutants clearly imply a loss, while in the context of CPRs; additional 
cattle in a pasture imply gains. Given that human beings tend to value losses greater 
than they do gains (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), this may explain, at least in part, 
why the absence of boundaries motivated action among a large number of parties 
facing the possibility of substantial individual and collective costs.
While CPR theory, in some ways, makes for an unusual candidate to explore 
the Montreal Protocol, the shift from theory to a framework provides a broader 
range of potentially relevant attributes compatible with multiple theories 
(Schlager 1999). As described earlier, a number of scholars studying the Montreal 
Protocol draw on particular theoretical foundations to understand the case and 
its performance (e.g. Litfin 1994; Benedick 1998; Parson 2003). Although 
this allows them to offer strong explanations of causal processes, it also risks 
neglecting additional factors that may have facilitated agreement and successful 
implementation. Therefore, rather than contesting these studies or their more 
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nuanced discussions, we combined them to help study the case through the SES 
framework. In doing so, we were able to identify a larger set of factors including 
political participation of key industrial actors like DuPont, nested governance, and 
scientific knowledge and consensus that increased the visibility of the relationship 
between ODS emissions and ozone concentrations as key variables, among others 
that likely contributed to the success of the Montreal Protocol.
5.2. Shortcomings and interesting analytical complexities
The SESMAD database provides a systematic approach to perform within-case 
analysis using temporally bounded snapshots (or observations) of a case. These 
snapshots, coded using multiple studies of the Montreal Protocol allowed us to 
identify important changes in the social and institutional environment that may 
have contributed to its success. However, this analysis also uncovered several 
weaknesses associated with the SESMAD approach. First, although snapshots are 
able to capture some of the complexity of the case, the coding of attributes tended 
to overlook their multidimensional nature, limited measurement to nominal 
or ordinal scales, and often required values to be determined by averaging 
over considerable heterogeneity. For example, the political power of actors is 
reduced to a single three-point ordinal measure which neglects details about the 
mechanisms by which that power is exercised, the contexts in which that power 
is manifested, and heterogeneities within a group of actors. Second, a number 
of variables identified as important by previous studies are not present in the 
SESMAD database. These include a sense of crisis in mobilizing actors despite 
uncertainty in the scientific knowledge base, and the role of media attention and 
NGO pressure in provoking a response. In short, the SESMAD approach helps 
to simplify and standardize a case for cross-case comparison, and generates 
potentially valuable insights by comparing snapshots for within-case analysis. 
However, other, more nuanced, case-specific questions may be better addressed 
by alternative approaches such as process tracing.
Finally, the research provides insights for possible future research directions. 
The intent is to use this study as a starting point for a systematic program of 
analysis of similar international pollution cases. Coding across a large number 
of such cases in a comparable manner will allow for hypothesis testing and more 
generalizable conclusions concerning the role that variables and their interactions 
play with respect to successful long-enduring institutional arrangements. 
Eventually, it is hoped that the results will provide policymakers with tools to 
craft better institutional arrangements for environmental governance – not unlike 
the role that atmospheric scientists played during the build-up to Montreal in this 
case. Similarly, we hope to explore the commonalities between pollution cases 
and other more “typical” CPR dilemmas to determine the extent to which existing 
knowledge can be used for governance of pollution problems. Thus the aim, 
broadly put, is to explore the possibility of “design principles” for international 
public good dilemmas and/or large-scale systems.
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6. Conclusion
While the Montreal Protocol is often viewed as over studied, alternative 
perspectives can illuminate important features of a case. In particular, as 
highlighted above, we note that previous studies tend to focus on a core set 
of variables, often in support of a narrow theoretical perspective. In contrast, 
we explore the complexity and potential importance of a large set of variables 
instrumental in creating the context that led to the unparalleled successes of 
the Montreal Protocol. Moreover, the case clearly demonstrates that although 
resource and actor attributes may pose immense governance challenges that 
their effects are mediated by regulatory institutions (Agrawal and Yadama 1997; 
Poteete and Ostrom 2004). In retrospect, the concentration of ODS production 
among few industrial actors in specific nation-states made the scale issue more 
manageable from a collective action standpoint by constructing a group that could 
be described as privileged (Olson 1965; Hardin 1982), although environmental 
effects remained global in scale.
The analysis presented in this case study suggests that successful governance 
of ODS for ozone protection was likely a function of a number of attributes 
including the global nature of environmental costs coupled with a small number 
of producers, heterogeneous endowments among nation-states, political activities 
of industrial stakeholders, and increasing scientific knowledge. While much of 
the knowledge generated in this report can be found in alternative accounts of the 
protocol, the multiple-methods approach adopted by the SESMAD project leaves 
open the possibility that additional insights may be gleaned from comparative and 
large-N analyses that include this case and, hopefully, make contributions toward 
more sustainable large-scale environmental governance.
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